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This article discusses the impact of host government policy inconsistency on multinational 
corporations’ relationships with local suppliers that benefit from public funding. Empirical 
findings suggest that such relationships suffer from transactions cost disadvantages, due to 
concerns that unexpected losses of funding may cause the suppliers to demand new contracts. 
The findings reflect statistical tests on a structural equation, latent variable model using data 
from a survey of 111 aIXliates of MNCs operating in 36 countries. 
1. Introduction 
This study examines some effects of government policy inconsistency on 
the organization of multinational corporations (MNCs) and their external 
supply networks. Many states have implemented policies to own, subsidize, 
finance, guarantee financing, or provide preferences to fund domestic firms 
that supply intermediate or final goods to international firms [See Evans 
(1979); Duvall and Freeman (1981)]. These policies generally aim to entice 
foreign direct investment or to bend MNCs’ operations to various national 
objectives. They may also seek to promote technology transfer, while 
reserving learning and profit opportunities in countries’ international econ- 
omic sectors for local interests. Some local firms may use these incentives to 
enter international markets, in effect renting their customers’ global networks 
[Kogut (1983, p. 51)]. 
While publicly-funded supply incentives provide potential production cost 
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savings to MNCs, state participation often increases their managers’ percep- 
tions of uncertainty. No matter how generous or apparently free-of-strings, 
these indirect subsidies create a Trojan horse of external dependence. As 
Roddewyn (1988: 343) put it, ‘What governments give, they can also take 
away, since they are sovereign.’ 
Supplier relationships that depend on governments’ policies suffer from at 
least two sources of uncertainty, beside those common to all contractual 
relationships. First, political phenomena such as elections, interest group 
rent-seeking, side effects, unadmitted intentions, bungling and national 
security contingencies may lead governments to unexpectedly alter policies.’ 
Second, contracts may prove unenforceable, because states embody the 
enforcement mechanisms [Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1987); Grandy (1989)]. 
If governments unexpectedly reduce or withdraw assistence, suppliers may 
have little choice but to pressure for contractual renegotiation or release. 
Resulting production interruptions, price increases, or switching costs may 
ripple through MNCs’ international systems, threatening their global compe- 
titive positions. For these reasons, contractual terms that rely on government 
assistance become viable planning assumptions only in light of managers’ 
past experiences and future expectations of a state’s policies’ consistency. If 
unexpected public policy changes have often damaged a firm’s interests in the 
past, managers will be reluctant to enter such contracts without other 
guarantees. As Teece pointed out 
in many instances, the governance machinery of international investment must be 
carefully configured to reduce the likelihood that costly haggling will break out between the 
multinational enterprise and host country, and also to protect transactions and contracts 
between independent host-country firms and downstream buyers (1986:41). 
This study investigated circumstances where subsidized host country 
suppliers support their relationships with MNCs by making transaction- 
specific investments. Transaction-specific assets, by definition earn inferior 
returns if transferred from their intended uses to alternative applications or 
relationships. Examples include dedicated facilities or machinery such as 
model-specific auto body metal stamping dies that exclusively serve a 
customer. The article provides empirical evidence that such investments can 
function as credible commitments, by serving as hostages against unilateral 
supply disruptions [See Schelling (1960; Williamson (1983, 1985)]. 
‘Many cases have been decumented in which developing host country governments contracted 
directly with MNCs to explore and extract natural resources, but demanded renegotiations once 
the firms established successful operations [See Mikesell (1971); Vernon (1971); Fagre and Wells 
(1982); Kobrin (1987); Comes-Casseres (1990) and many others]. Vernon termed this dynamic 
‘the obsolescing bargain.’ Lenway and Crawford (1986) have studied disruptions to international 
business transactions which take place when policy makers unexpectedly construe them as 
relevant to national security. 
TP. Murtha, Credible enticements 173 
2. Model and methodology 
I assume that the transactions costs of subcontracting with subsidized local 
suppliers increase with uncertainty accrued from MNCs’ past experiences of 
host government policy inconsistency. As uncertainty increases across coun- 
tries, MNCs’ managers should be expected to accord increasing importance 
to these suppliers’ transaction-specific asset exposures. 
Testing this hypothesis requires measurement of perceptual correlates of 
transactions costs and statistical tests of relationships among them. Percep- 
tions, unlike variables such as prices, can not be observed. Instead, these are 
hypothesized as common factors or latent variables underlying observable 
indicators. Increasingly refined techniques have emerged in recent years for 
estimating the parameters of such models. The covariance structure model 
employed here can incorporate latent variables as either dependent or 
independent variables in systems of simultaneous, linear regression 
equations.2 Its general form is the structural equation 
where u] and 5 represent vectors of dependent and independent random 
variables, /l and I- represent coefficient matrices, and i represents equation 
error. The variables q and I: cannot be observed. Instead, the investigator 
observes vectors of indicators y and x, such that 
Y=Q+E, and (2) 
x=A,(+6, (3) 
where nY and /1, are matrices of parameters and E and 6 are vectors of 
measurement errors. 
Eqs. (2) and (3) constitute the measurement model. In this study, proposed 
latent variable indicators were incorporated into a questionnaire sent to 
MNC affiliate managers in 36 countries. Their responses provided data to 
test the indicators’ reliability as latent variable measures. Then the combined 
structural equation and measurement model parameters were simultaneously 
estimated and tested for significance. Subsequent sections report details of 
each of these steps. 
2Kmenta (1986, pp. 581-7), Deleeuw, Keller and Wansbeek (1983) and Aigner et al. in 
Griliches and Intriligator (1984) discuss econometric applications of such models. Long’s guide 
(1983) helpfully reconciles discrepancies between psychometric and econometric statistical 
terminology. 
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2.1. The structural equation model and hypotheses 
The structural model consists in three equations that construe external 
sourcing in host countries as a joint outcome of (1) MNCs’ international 
competitive strategies, which rely on their production and transactions cost 
advantages over host country suppliers; (2) host states’ policies to build 
competitive domestic suppliers and (3) organizational aspects of domestic 
politics that help states to maintain policy consistency. 
I assume that MNCs’ international strategies allocate their activities 
among countries, and between their affiliates’ value-added chains and those 
of outside suppliers [Kogut (1985); Porter (1990)]. The resulting international 
goods and information exchange networks embody MNCs’ firm-specific 
production and transactions cost advantages over host country firms and 
other MNCs (Dunning, 1988). MNCs gain production cost advantages by 
owning technology, managerial systems, raw materials sources, and optimal 
scale plants that can fill substantial proportions of demand in imperfect 
markets, and through their abilities to shift production among countries to 
reflect changing factor cost conditions [Kogut (1985)]. Transactions-cost 
advantages arise because MNCs’ networks permit them to undercut market 
contracting costs, by coordinating economic activities within their organiza- 
tions [Buckley and Casson (1976); Rugman (198 1); Hennart (1982); Teece 
(1986); Dunning (1988)]. Optimal network configurations source all activities 
at least-cost sites around the world. In theory, MNCs’ affiliates and local 
firms face the same factor cost conditions in a given host country. In 
practice, institutional details such as patterns of unionization can create 
differences. The following proposition necessarily holds, for a measure to 
control for MNCs’ production and transactions cost advantages. 
H,(y,) As MNCs’ production and transactions cost advantages over 
external contractors increase, afftliates’ outsourcing decreases. 
The yi and pi in this and subsequent hypotheses correspond to the 
parameters in the equation system to be introduced shortly. 
State-funded local sourcing incentives aim to alter MNCs’ optimal subcon- 
tracting levels. Assuming subsidized suppliers can equal or beat MNC’s 
production costs, MNCs’ managers must also consider transactions cost 
disadvantages attributable to the state’s intervention. I assume that managers 
take subjective account of these costs, through introspection of their 
uncertainty concerning government policy consistency. I suggest that policy 
inconsistency diminishes or precludes sourcing from subsidized suppliers, 
unless the suppliers own transaction-specific investments that can credibly 
commit them to the relationships. Where perceived policy consistency 
minimizes such concerns, contracts may provide sufficient guarantees. 
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Transaction-specific investments assume less salience. Other factors held 
constant, therefore, the following hypotheses apply: 
HZ(P2) Managers’ perceptions of the importance of transaction- 
specific assets in relationships with subsidized suppliers 
associate negatively with perceived host government policy 
consistency. 
Hs(/?i) As managers’ perceptions of the importance of transaction- 
specific investments in relationships with subsidized suppliers 
increases, affiliates’ external sourcing increases. 
The model also reflects propositions that associate MNCs’ managers’ 
perceptions of government policy consistency with directly observable organ- 
izational attributes of domestic politics. Details of this argument appear 
elsewhere [Murtha (1989, 1991)]. In summary, it proposes that policy 
consistency associates with (1) the tendency of the political party most 
persistently controlling the executive branch to succeed itself; (2) electoral 
rules that encourage legislative coalitions rather than winner-take-all politics; 
and (3) the central government’s financial resources, relative to other 
domestic governmental units and to the overall size of the economy. In the 
following structural system, eq. (6) reflects these propositions, eq. (4) reflects 
H, and H,, and eq. (5) reflects H,. 
Yll=Blt/2-YlSl+il~ (4) 
v2= -B2tl3+12, (5) 
r3 = y2t2 + y3t3 +Y& + 13, where (6) 
111 is a managerial estimate of the percentage of local external sourcing 
in an affiliate’s total costs. 
‘12 is a latent variable representing MNCs’ managers’ perceptions of 
transaction-specific investments’ importance in relationships with 
state-funded suppliers. 
v3 is a latent variable representing managers’ perceptions of govern- 
ment economic policy consistency. 
51 is a latent variable representing managers’ perceptions of lirm- 
specific cost advantages over local suppliers. 
t2, t3, t4 are exogenous, directly observable attributes of host country politi- 
cal organization. 
Bi represent parameter estimates on endogenous variables. 
Yi represent parameter estimates on exogenous variables. 
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ii represent equation error. 
2.2. The measurement model 
The measurement equation for the dependent variables external sourcing 
(qr), suppliers’ transaction specific investments (q2), and government policy 
consistency (q3) is: 
where the ~__I yi are hypothesized observable ir rd icators of ylr, q2, and q3, the & 
represent parameters to be estimated on the latent variables, and the si 
represent measurement error. One element of the coefftcient matrix A, is 
constrained to 1 for v],, and q3, in order to scale their measurement units3 
The same holds true for AY element (1, l), which corresponds to the single 
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The yi pertain to questionnaire data. The formula given respondents to 
guide estimation of external sourcing (qr) was 
Yl i = DCJC,, 
where DCi represents domestic non-wage costs for company i, and Ci 
represents affiliates total costs, including their intratirm components. 
Indicators y, - y, refer to the importance of state-funded suppliers’ 
transaction-specific assets (q2). Respondents identified subcontractors with 
host government subsidies, loans, equity or contracts with state-owned 
enterprises, and evaluated the importance in these relationships of three types 
of transaction-specific investments [See Williamson (1985, p. 55)]. If govern- 
3As latent variables are unobservable, measurement units must be arbitrarily scaled. Corres- 
ponding measurement error terms are set to zero. 
‘Single indicator variables are assumed directly observable. The estimation procedure does 
not regard them as representing underlying factors, nor take measurement error into account, 
but enters them diretcly into the regression analysis. 
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ment funding or a type of asset specificity did not figure in the relationships, 
respondents scored items zero. If both figured, items were scored from 1 (not 
important) to 4 (often critical). Items were 
y, adjacent facilities (site-specificity). 
y, orders comprising the entire annual output of certain facilities (dedicated 
asset specificity). 
y, manufacturing personnel’s experience using your products (human asset 
specificity). 
y, government job-training programs or credits aimed at processes that 
make or use the goods traded (human asset specificity). 
Indicators y, -y, refer to perceptions of government policy consistency 
(q3). On a 5-part scale, respondents noted the frequency over 5 years of 
government policy changes which negatively affected their businesses. Items 
were 
y, unexpected tariff, local content, export quota or other trade regulation 
changes. 
y, loss of busines advantage due to government approval delays. 
y, supplier unreliability due to government contract problems. 
The measurement equation for the independent latent variable for firm 
specific cost advantage (<i) and the independent observable political vari- 
ables t2, r3 and &, is 
‘1 000 
2 x2 0 0 0 
II x3 0 0 0 




+ 64 9 II 0.0 0.0 0.0 (8) 
where the xi are latent and non-latent ti indicators, the iXi are parameter 
estimates and the di are measurement errors. 
Indicators xi -x4 pertain to questionnaire data on MNCs’ affiliates’ 
production and transactions cost advantages (ti). Respondents scored their 
afftliates’ highest-cost value-chain activity on factors relevant to subcontract- 
ing it to a competent local supplier or market entrant. The six-step scale 
ranged from strongly favoring outside supply to precluding it. Items were 
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scale economies (xi), labor costs (x,), inventory costs (x3) and risk of 
potential suppliers becoming market competitors (x4). Indicators x5, xg and 
x7 pertain to measures of the directly-observable country political organiza- 
tion variables t2, r3 and c4. Murtha (1991) reports these data, relevant 
calculations, and their underlying archival raw data sources. 
The measure x5 refers to the degree of executive branch single party 
dominance calculated as the percentage of months in which the dominant 
party held office from January, 1946 through December 1986. ‘Dominant 
party’ is defined as the party holding the office for the most time since World 
War II. 
Government financial strength (x6) may be evaluated relative to either the 
domestic private sector, or to other states. The model was alternately 
estimated using per capita gross domestic product to measure the latter, and 
central government revenue as a percentage of GDP to measure the former.5 
The measure x, refers to Rae and Taylor’s legislative party fractionaliza- 
tion (1970), defined as the probability that two random draws from a 
national legislature will yield members of different political parties.6 High 
values associate with proportional representation electoral rules.’ Pro- 
portional representation encourages legislative parties to multiply, so that 
their viabilities as governing parties depend on participation in coalitions. 
This condition places a premium on consensus and long-term working 
relationships that cut across party lines [See Lijphart (1984); Katzenstein 
(1984)]. 
Fig. 1 presents the combined structural equation and measurement model 
in conventional schematic form. Circles represent structural equation vari- 
ables; squares represent measurement indicators. Greek notation is as 
specified above. 
3. Results 
In this section, I discuss the study’s field work, latent variable reliability 
tests, model estimation; and results. 
3.1. Field work 
Between November, 1986 and June, 1987, I mailed a questionnaire to 203 
sGDP per capita was taken as reported by the International Monetary Fund (1986) for 1984. 
Central government revenue as a percentage of GDP was calculated for 1984 or most recent 
year available. 
6The statistic was calculated for legislatures as of 1986. 
‘Proportional representation awards legislative seats to all parties participating in an election 
based on the percentages of the overall vote (above some minimum) that they win. By contrast, 
majoritarian, geographical representation systems award seats to the top vote getters in each 
district. See Lijphart (1984). 
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Fig. 1. Path diagram depicting combined structural equation and measurement model, 
hypothesized signs. 
with 
foreign affiliates of 23 U.S. non-defense manufacturing MNCs8 One 
hundred and twenty-nine responded. Of these, 111 individual company 
responses proved usable. These represent 15 industries in 36 countries. 
Table 1 presents the country list. The industries are adhesives, auto parts, 
automation, automobiles, computers, electric devices, electric motors, 
fasteners, filtration, heavy transport, pharmaceuticals, security devices, 
specialty materials, tires and rubber, and toiletries. Respondents held 
job titles of purchasing manager, manufacturing materials manager, supply 
manager, works manager, manufacturing director, business planning, develop- 
ment or strategy staff, and managing director. 
“The questionnaire was designed and pretested as part of this study. The respondent group 
was assembled on the basis of 146 cold calls to head offices of MNCs listed in the Conference 
Board’s Key Companies Directory (1986). 







included in the respondent group, categorized by per capita income levels according 
Bank criteria (see 1988 World Development Report, New York, Oxford University 
Press). Parentheses contain numbers of observations. 
Industrial market economies: Australia (5) Belgium (4) Canada (3) Denmark (I) France (3) 
Germany (8) Ireland (1) Italy (4) Japan (5) Luxembourg (I) Netherlands (3) 
New Zealand (4) Spain (6) Sweden (3) Switzerland (2) United Kingdom (10) USA (6) 
tipper middle income ecnnomirs: Argentina (3) Brazil (7) Chile (1) Hong Kong (2) Korea (2) 




ziower middle income economies: Columbia (1) Indonesia (1) Thailand (I) 
Zimbabwe (1) 
Low-income economies: India (1) Kenya (2) Pakistan (I) 
._ 
3.2 Latent variable reliability 
After completing the survey, I chose sets of indicators for each latent 
variable from the questionnaire, in accordance with prior intention and ex 
post inspection of the survey data. These were submitted to confirmatory 
factor analysis, to establish their reliabilities as measures. Reliability, in this 
context, refers to the ratio of common to overall variance in a set of 
indicators, explained by an hypothesized underlying common factor. Levels 
of 0.6 or above meet conventional standards [Bagozzi and Yi (1988)].9 
Reliabilities are 0.732, 0.832 and 0.927, respectively for the indicators chosen 
for yap, qj and tl. 
3.3. Parameter estimation and results 
The combined structural equation and measurement model parameters 
were estimated using a full information maximum likelihood (FIML) compu- 
tational procedure.“’ Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the last of two 
rounds of estimation. In the first round, no zero restrictions were imposed on 
the exogenous variables’ coefficient matrix. This procedure uncovered several 
unpredicted significant (at p 5 0. IO) relationships among the structural equa- 
tion variables. The second round estimated the model presented in section 2, 
augmented to include the significant relationships uncovered in round one.” 
Table 3 presents the structural equation parameter estimates, t tests of 
significance and the chi-square test of overall model goodness-of-fit. Table 2 
‘Bagozzi (1980, pp. 176- 183) provides details of the calculation. 
“‘Estimation used the LISREL computer program [Joreskog and Sorbom (1988)]. 
“In all cases, the equation systems were specified as recursive (/? triangular) with the equation 
error covariance matrix restricted to diagonal. This specification excludes simul~dneous causa- 
tion, and imposes an assumption of uncorrelated structural equation errors. Such systems, by 
definition, meet criteria for exact identification of their parameters [See Long (1983, pp. 3436)]. 
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Table 2 
Measurement model estimation. 
Latent variables and jndicators (y,.x) 
181 
MNCs’ managers’ perception of the importunce qf government-subsidized suppliers’ 
transaction-specific investments (q2) 
Y2 adjacent facilities (site-related) 
y, orders comprising the entire annual output of certain facilities (dedicated) 
y, manufacturing personnel’s experience in using your products (human) 
y, government job-training programs or credits aimed at processes which 
make or use the goods traded (human) 
MNC’s managers’ perceptions ~Jgovernment policy consistency (q3) 
Y6 unexpected tariff, local content export quota or other trade regulation 
changes 
y, loss of business advantage due to government approval delays 
ss supplier unreliability due to government contract problems 
MNC’s managers’ perceptions oJ their affiliate’s production and transactions cost 
advantage ouer potential sub-contractors (5,) 
XI economies of scale 
x2 labor costs 
x3 inventory costs 























“t-values are shown under parameter estimates. 
bAs latent variables are unobservable, units of measurement are arbitrary. Consequently, one 
parameter was set to unit value for each latent variable, in order to scale its measurement. 
Significance tests do not apply for these indicators. 
*Significant at the ~$0.10 level, two-tailed. 
**Significant at the p<O.O5 level, two-tailed. 
***Significant at the p jO.01 level, two-tailed. 
presents coefficient estimates and t tests of significance for the regression of 
the indicators in the latent variables.12 
Estimation and test results supported the main hypotheses that 
transaction-specific asset exposures can offset MNCs’ reticence to enter 
relationships with suppliers funded by host states with inconsistent policies. 
All coeffkients of the observable indicators on the latent variables were 
“Regressions of indicators on latent variables may be interpreted as factor loadings. T-tests of 
significance are reported because confirmatory factor analysis requires sets of indicators to be 
selected a priori, subject to statistical support as hypothesized observable correlates of each 
latent variable. 
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Table 3 









MNCs’ mgrs’ perceptions of importance of 
government subsidized suppliers’ 
transaction-specific investments (n2) 
MNCs’ mgrs’ perceptions of government 
policy consistency ~a) 
MNCs’ mgrs’ perceptions of their affiliates’ 
production and transactions cost advantages 
over potential suppliers (5,) 
Single party dominance of government 
executive branch (E2) 
GDP per capita (la) 
Legislative party factionalization (<,) 








-0.185 _ 0.392 
- 1.905* 5.349*** 
_ _ 0.102 
I.599 
Measures of over-all goodness-of-fit 
Chi-squared (86 d.f.) = 93.09 
Probability level =0.282 
Goodness-of-tit index = 0.905 
Adjusted goodness-of-tit index = 0.664 
Root mean square residual = 0.058 
Total coefficient of determination for structural equations=0.515 
“t-values are shown under parameter estimates. 
*Significant at the p ~0.10 level, two-tailed. 
**Significant at the pjO.05 level, two-tailed. 
***Significant at the psO.01 level, two-tailed. 
positive and significant. Unambiguous support emerged for the expected 
negative relationship between perceived government policy consistency and 
importance of state-funded suppliers’ transaction specific assets (HZ on fi2 in 
eq. (5); t = -4.124, p 50.01). Transaction specific assets also proved positive 
and significant at ~50.10 in the external sourcing equation (H3 on pi in eq. 
(4)). The control variable, firm-specific cost advantage displayed the expected 
negative sign, and was significant at p 5 0.05. 
The country political organizational variables, single party dominance and 
GDP per capita performed as expected in eq. (6) for policy consistency, 
significant at p =< 0.05 and 0.0 1, respectively. Legislative party fractionaliza- 
tion did not perform. In addition to the expected relationship of eq. (6), party 
dominance proved positive and significant (psO.01) in the transaction 
specificity eq. (5) while GDP per capita was negative and significant 
(~50.10) in eq. (4) for external sourcing. 
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Central government revenue as a percentage of GDP was substituted for 
GDP per capita in an alternative model specification. In these results (not 
reported here), all hypothesized variables in the augmented model, including 
legislative party fractionalization took their expected signs and were signifi- 
cant at ~50.05 or better. In addition, the revenue measure proved significant 
in the asset specificity eq. (5). The GDP per capita formulation, however, 
significantly outperformed the alternative in tests of overall model tit, and 
held a 15 percentage point advantage in total R2 (0.365 compared to 
0.515).‘3 
Overall goodness-of-fit statistics, on balance, favor accepting the model as 
adequate. The chi-square value of 93.09, 86 degrees of freedom, suggests that 
the data fail to reject the model at a probability level of 0.28. Root mean 
square residual was 0.058, and Joreskog and Sorbom’s adjusted goodness-of- 
tit ratio was 0.664. These last two results fall short of conservative ideals of 
0.05 and ‘about 0.9,’ [Bagozzi and Yi (1988)]. 
3.4. Discussion 
Support for the key hypotheses rests on a few relationships embedded in a 
multiple equation system. The model’s relative complexity represents a 
tradeoff between parsimony, and the ability to identify relationships sug- 
gested by theory within the institutional setting that imparts their main 
applied interest. Indeed, the surprising relationships of single party domi- 
nance to transaction-specificity (positive), and of GDP per capita to external 
sourcing (negative) suggest interesting ways to qualify and elaborate the 
main argument. 
High party dominance values typify newly-industrialized authoritarian and 
single-party states, but only a few industrialized democracies, such as Japan, 
Italy and Sweden. The positive party dominance/asset specificity relationship, 
therefore, implies that government policy inconsistency may pose a greater 
threat to agreements in developing countries than in industrialized countries. 
Yet this relationship and the positive party dominance/policy consistency 
relationship seem contradictory, given the negative relationship observed 
between policy consistency and asset specificity. Consistent local content 
regulations may offer one explanation. The latent variable representing asset 
specificity in state-subsidized supply relationships may take non-zero values 
I31 interpret the revenue measure to represent state financial strength as a domestic political 
organizational phenomenon and GDP per capita as a measure of relative international strength. 
The two measures are not correlated. In estimation of the alternative model specification, central 
government revenue also entered the asset specificity equation with positive sign. Inspection of 
the data suggests that high revenue countries, while often industrialized democracies, also often 
have relatively large public sectors. Large public sectors may correspond to a higher incidence of 
state owned enterprises, and of the types of state intervention captured in the transaction- 
specificity equation. Estimation results for the alternative model may be obtained from the 
author. 
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relatively more often under authoritarianism, simply because these states 
consistently intervene in their economies. Limited experience may lead 
MNCs to weigh supplier asset-specificity more heavily in developing coun- 
tries, irrespective of the government’s record. In rapid industrialization, 
economic events may outrun institutional arrangements and foreign inves- 
tors’ perceptions formed in the past. Time-series analysis might demonstrate 
that as economies develop, both policy inconsistency and the importance of 
asset specificity diminish. 
High GDP countries tend to be economically and politically advanced 
industrialized democracies. Substituting GDP for the alternative revenue 
measure of state financial strength yielded a relatively large y and r-statistic 
(IJ =0.392; t= 5.35, psO.01 and increased R*), but greatly attenuated almost 
every other equation parameter estimate. These factors imply that GDP or 
correlated factors play important roles in determining MNCs’ external 
sourcing in countries. But the discovery of a negative relationship contradicts 
intuition, given the relative vitality of many of these economies. 
Several factors may skew MNCs’ external sourcing away from industria- 
lized countries, and toward developing countries. Local content rules and/or 
political instability may lead MNCs to outsource rather than own facilities in 
developing countries to take advantage of lower factor costs, including 
wages. External sourcing minimizes exposure to coercive measures including 
expropriation, and maintains network flexibility. This explanation comple- 
ments findings that suppliers’ transaction-specific assets can substitute for 
government policy consistency. In the absence of such assurances, more 
flexible MNCs may choose to outsource elsewhere. 
The findings also have implications for governments’ strategies to attract 
foreign direct investment and tailor MNC performance to national priorities. 
Robinson’s survey evidence (1983) implied that governments often pay 
MNCs to take actions that they would have taken anyway, because 
managers net out government incentives when they make strategic decisions. 
The managers reason that the undertakings must meet company objectives 
even if governments change their policies. Up-front credible enticements such 
as site-specific infrastructural investments, subsidizing suppliers’ dedicated 
facilities or funding highly-specific worker training may have a greater 
impact on MNCs’ decisions, than cash subsidies paid out over time. They 
may also meet a higher standard of domestic political acceptability. 
4. Conclusion 
This article applied transactions cost economics to empirically analyze the 
effects of governments’ policies on MNCs’ organization structures. Organiza- 
tion structure here refers to consequences of MNCs’ decisions about whether 
to locate activities within affiliates organizations, or to purchase them from 
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independent subcontractors. Previous empirical studies of MNC/host state 
interaction have concerned direct, bilateral bargaining and usually used 
affiliate ownership structure as dependent variables [See Mikesell (1971); 
Vernon (1971); Fagre and Wells (1972); LeCraw (1984); Kobrin (1987); 
Gomes-Casseres (1990)]. 
This article shares this literature’s concern with the apportionment of 
property rights, but seeks a more detailed elaboration of institutional 
arrangements among MNCs, host states, and other host country actors. 
Previous studies have modeled interaction between aggregate host country 
interests and MNCs over shares in affiliates’ income streams. These host 
country interests include taxes and royalties that accrue to the state, and 
equity stakes that may accrue to either states or private individuals. This 
study separated host country public and commercial interests, and modeled 
interactions with foreigners over rights to perform production activities. This 
approach permitted third parties in host countries - MNCs’ suppliers - to be 
explicitly included. 
This study, although it pertained to a particular class of transactions, 
provides an empirical basis to speculate on a range of circumstances where 
MNCs’ local transactions become dependent on host governments’ plans and 
agreements that they did not negotiate, and that can not be enforced. In 
these circumstances, exchange may fail unless host country elements can 
assure MNCs that they will fulfill their contractual commitments, even if 
their governments change policies. Similar considerations surely apply in 
planned economies and the transitional economies of Eastern Europe, where 
states must live down past behavior, private commercial organizations have 
murky, black-market pasts, and markets have short histories. 
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